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Abstract
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act is the most significant overhaul of the U.S. federal tax system in the last two
decades. This paper seeks to discuss some of its most significant provisions and examine their overall impact
on the U.S. economy, especially throughout the ongoing coronavirus pandemic.
This paper begins by undertaking an overview of the legislative history of the Act and then proceeds to
discuss three provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Acts which have had a tremendous impact on the U.S.
economy by altering some major provisions of the United States Internal Revenue Code of 1986. I conclude
my review and discussion of each provision by providing a critique of the provision and proposing
recommendations and amendments which should be made to the Act, if these provisions are to remain viable,
in light of recent developments.

Key Words.
Tax. Internal Revenue Code. FDII – Foreign Derived Intangible Income. Accelerated Depreciation. Economy.
Covid-19. Inflow. Congress. Investment. Policy.
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Introduction.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump signed The Tax Cuts and Job Act, hereinafter referred to as the (“Act”)
into law on the 22nd day of December 2017. By this singular act, the Trump administration undertook some
of the most extensive Code reforms of the last two decades.
President Trump touted the Act to be the “biggest tax cut in American history and one for which everyone is
better for.”1 In April 2017, the Trump administration released a skeletal tax outline2 which demonstrated the
intent of the administration to reduce federal revenue by almost eight trillion USD. However, the legislation
eventually passed by Congress is estimated to bring about a 1.65 trillion dollars reduction in federal revenue
over the next 10 years.3
The Act was enacted pursuant to a budget reconciliation process and so took a much shorter timeframe than
a typical legislative process, and quite a number of the substantial changes brought about by this Act are
largely temporary such as some modifications to the tax rates and obligations of private individuals.
At the international front, by introducing a form of participation exemption the Act further moved the U.S.
towards a territorial tax system.

1

President Trump Remarks at Rally in Great Falls, Montana, C.Span (July 5, 2018), https://www.cspan.org/video/?447876-1/president-trump-delivers-remarks-rally-great-falls-montana&start=3998
2

The White House, 2017 Tax Reform for Economic Growth and American Jobs (Apr. 26, 2017),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/content/dam/jofa/news/2017-tax-reform-for-economic-growth.jpg
3

Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-tcja-affectfederal-budgetoutlook#:~:text=Conventional%20estimates&text=This%20figure%20comes%20from%20the,trillion%20from
%202018%20to%202027 (last updated May 2020)
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Legislative History.
The legislative history of the Act can be traced to the 19th day of July 2017, when the House Budget
Committee held a markup on reconciliation instructions and the 2018 FY concurrent resolution on the budget
(H. Con. Res. 71).
H. Con. Res. 71 was accompanied by House Report 115-240. The resolution and the report directed the
House Committee on Ways and Means, the lead committee on taxation matters, and other committees to
establish the allocation of spending authority to House committees, identify accounts eligible for advance
appropriations, and set forth the appropriate budgetary levels for fiscal years 2019 through 2027.4
Afterwards, the legislative process stalled and the resolution was not presented for a vote until October 5,
2017, when House members voted largely along party lines, to pass H. Con. Res. 71.
Pursuant to this directive and in line with the budget reconciliation process, two weeks after the passage of
H. Con. Res. 71, amendment 1116 was made to H. Con. Res. 71 and passed by the Senate speedily. The
House passed this amended version on October 26, 2017, by a simple majority vote, effectively paving the
way for introduction of tax legislation into the House of Representatives.5
On November 2, 2017, the House bill H.R. 1 was officially termed the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act and was officially
introduced into the United States House of Representatives by Congressman Kevin Brady6.
On November 3, 2017, the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee publicized an amendment
to H.R.1, afterward further committee markups were held between November 6th – 9th, 2017, resulting in the

4

Legislative History of Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Drexel University Legal Research Center,
https://drexellaw.libguides.com/c.php?g=732113&p=5230265 (last updated Jan. 6, 2021)
5

6

Id

Woodlands Online, Kevin Brady Introduces Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Receives Kudos from President Donald
Trump, U.S. Congressman Kevin Brady (Nov. 3, 2017),
https://kevinbrady.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=400863
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House Report 115-409 (2017). On November 9 the House Ways and Means Committee passed the bill
advancing it to the House floor.7
On Nov 16, 2017, by a vote of 227-205,8 the bill was approved by the House and on the same day the Senate
Committee on Finance submitted the bill to the Senate Committee on Budget.
On November 28, 2017, riding on a simple majority vote, the Senate Budget Committee reported a bill for
reconciliation pursuant to title II of the concurrent resolution on the budget for the fiscal year 2018. This bill
included legislative text from the Committee on Finance.9
A motion to proceed was approved by the entire Senate on November 1 by simple majority vote, and by
December 2, an amended version of H.R.1 was approved.
A conference committee comprised of representatives of both the House and Senate unveiled a new version
of the legislation on December 15, 2017, and the House approved this by a simple majority vote on December
19, 2017. The Senate subsequently passed the bill on December 20, 2017, after making technical
corrections, and the House approved this amended version on the same day by a vote of 224 – 201.10
Former President Trump signed the tax bill into law on December 22, 2017.11

7

Jacob Pramuk, House Republicans Advance Tax Bill, Aim to Bring It to a Vote Next Week, CNBC (Nov. 9,
2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/09/gop-tax-reform-plan-advanced-by-house-ways-and-meanscommittee.html
8

Final Vote Results for Roll Call 637, United States Senate (Nov. 16, 2017, 1:48 PM),
https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll637.xml
9

Molly F. Sherlock & Donald J. Marples, The 2017 Tax Revision (P.L. 115-97): Comparison to 2017 Tax
Law, Congressional Research Service, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45092.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2021)
10

Thomas Kaplan, House Gives Final Approval to Sweeping Tax Overhaul, New York Times (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/20/us/politics/tax-bill-republicans.html
11

John Wagner, Trump Signs Sweeping Tax Bill Into Law, Washington Post (Dec. 22, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/12/22/trump-signs-sweeping-tax-bill-into-law/
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Analysis of Some Key Provisions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.
Accelerated Depreciation.
The current regime of tax laws in the United States provides for accelerated depreciation primarily under
section 179 and section 168(k) of the Code, as modified by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.12
Both provisions have several differences such as the target business structure and the amount that
businesses can save under each. However, they both share the same primary policy objective of stimulating
the economy.

Accelerated Depreciation under Section 179 of the Code - Expensing of Equipment.
Expensing of equipment provides for a procedure by which business establishments upon incurring certain
categories of current business expenditure13 can claim a deduction up to the full cost of the current asset
purchased.
This tax policy which is targeted at small to medium-size business structures, can be traced to April 1958
when amidst widespread demand for tax legislation that would stimulate small businesses, the House Ways
and Means Committee introduced a small business tax revision bill.14 This bill underwent several revisions
and amendments, and in September 1958 the United States Congress enacted the bill into law. This new
law contained several significant provisions, such as a first-year depreciation allowance.
Similar to the Small Business Tax Revision Act of September 1958, section 179 of the U.S. Code as amended
by the TCJA aims to stimulate the growth of small businesses and by extension - the economy, considerably

12

All references to “Code” are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986

13

26 U.S.C. § 179 provides a general list of depreciable tangible property and equipment which may be
expensed.
14

Karl R. Price, The Small Business Tax Revision of 1958, JSTOR,
https://www.jstor.org/stable/40683312?seq=1 (last visited Feb. 22, 2021)
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reduce the tax obligations of businesses that seek to invest and expand, and simplify tax accounting for
smaller firms.15
Prior to the enactment of the TCJA, expensing provisions under section 179 of the Code was capped at five
hundred thousand dollars. This cap effectively limited the type of businesses that can take advantage of the
incentive to relatively small businesses. The TCJA increased this cap to one million dollars, thereby
broadening the spectrum of business sizes that can benefit under this provision.
Since 1958, successive U.S. governments have employed expensing of equipment as a tax policy incentive
to benefit small businesses and stimulate the U.S. economy. The success of this policy thrust is a matter of
great debate and I will examine this subsequently.

Accelerated Depreciation under Section 168(k) of the Code – Bonus Depreciation
Before the enactment of the TCJA, the Code permitted a first-year depreciation deduction up to a maximum
of 50 percent of the adjusted cost of qualifying property, purchased and placed in service prior to January
2020 or 2021 as applicable under the Code16.
The TCJA made several temporary17 but critical amendments to section 168(k) of the Code. The most
significant amongst these amendments which is most relevant to this paper is contained under section 13201
of the Act.

15

Gary Guenther, The Section 179 and Section 168(k) Expensing Allowances: Current Law and Economic
Effects, Congressional Research Service Reports (May 1, 2018),
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL31852.html#_Toc524529324
16

Report of the Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 1, the ‘‘Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,’’ H. Rep. No. 115–
409, November 13, 2017.
17

The 100% expense deduction will cease to apply on Dec 31, 2022.
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Section 13201 increases the amount which can be expensed under section 168(k) to the full cost of qualifying
property either purchased before September 28, 2017, but placed in service after September 2017, or both
purchased and placed in service after September 27, 2017, but before January 2023. I will discuss the
significance of this amendment in subsequent paragraphs

Qualifying Property
The Joint Committee on Taxation describes a property that qualifies for expensing as depreciable tangible
personal property purchased for use in the normal course of business activities18.
The TCJA also broadened the scope of property that qualifies for expensing under section 179 of the Code
beyond just new equipment, to include used tangible property. Purchase of property or equipment from nonrelated parties that have been previously used by an independent third party or another unrelated party now
qualifies for expensing as long as they are to be utilized in the active conduct of the purchaser’s trade or
business.
The TCJA amended section 168(k) of the Code to broaden the definition of qualifying property to include
eligible equipments acquired and placed in service after September 27, 2017, and in the case of items such
as aircrafts, acquired and placed in service before January 1, 2023. Eligible automobiles and SUVs subject
to the limitations of depreciating luxury vehicles19 are also deemed qualifying property. The TCJA also
amended section 168(k) to include the purchase of used equipment in an arm’s length transaction, as eligible
for expensing under section 168(k).
Film, television, and live theatrical productions which were commercially broadcasted or released after
September 27, 2017, but before January 1, 2027, and which would have been deductible up to fifteen million

18

Joint Committee on Taxation, General Explanation of Public Law No. 115–97 (JCS–1–18), December 2018

19

I.R.C. § 280(f)
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USD as provided by the Code20 is deemed qualifying property. Other real property which meets the
exceptions outlined under the Act will also be deemed eligible for expensing.
Modifications of Rules for Expensing Depreciable Business Assets
Upon purchase and utilization of qualifying equipment or machinery for business operations, a business
owner who pays taxes may elect to expense the cost of the machinery in lieu of amortizing the cost or
deducting depreciation expenses annually.
The TCJA doubles the previously applicable amount that business owners can expense upon the purchase
of qualifying business equipment under section 179 of the Code from five hundred thousand USD ($500,000)
to one million USD ($1,000,000). The Act also increases the amount at which a taxpayer is ineligible to benefit
completely from this tax incentive to two million five hundred thousand USD ($2,500,000). Like most tax
provisions, these amounts are to be adjusted for inflation.
The TCJA also broadens the category of improvements that are eligible to be expensed under section 179
of the Code to include those made to nonresidential real property, which meets certain conditions.21

The Effects of Accelerated Depreciation as a Tax Policy Incentive on The U.S. Economy.
Proponents of section 179 expensing and section 168(k) bonus depreciation tax allowance argue that this
policy thrust extensively stimulates the U.S. economy and increases government revenue primarily by
incentivizing businesses to undertake investments and expand their operations, even if this is capitalintensive, due to benefits such as immediately decreased tax obligations. Accelerated depreciation is

20

21

I.R.C § 181

I.R.C § 179(f)(2). Heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning property includes all components (whether in,
on, or adjacent to the building) of a central air conditioning or heating system, including motors, compressors,
pipes and ducts. Treas. Reg. sec. 1.48–1(e)(2).
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undoubtedly valuable to achieving lower cost of capital, simpler accounting methods and increasing the shortterm liquidity of business owners. However, the long-term beneficial viability of this tax policy on the larger
economy is highly contested amongst economists and tax professionals.
The first criticism of utilizing accelerated depreciation as a policy thrust under section 179 of the Code is this:
Accelerated depreciation as a tax policy incentive to spur expansion and investment by business owners fails
to consider the myriad of factors which businesses must consider to make their expansion and investment
decisions. Some of these factors are:
Elasticity.
The price elasticity of demand and supply and the ability of fluctuations brought about by this metric to
diminish or erode gains if increased demand makes prices soar up to or above the phase-out threshold
amount.
Section 179 of the Code caps the amount that can be expensed to one million dollars. This provision aims to
encourage businesses to undertake capital-intensive expansion, which could shore up demand across
industries for such qualifying equipment and in equal proportion - the prices of such equipment beyond the
limit of a million dollars.
This criticism may have been addressed by the TCJA’s amendment of section 168(k) of the Code, which
permits businesses to expense up to the full cost of eligible purchases – under its 100 percent bonus
depreciation. However, not all businesses and corporations find section 168(k) bonus depreciation most
beneficial due to benefits that may not be readily available under the 100 percent bonus depreciation
provisions of section 168(k),22 and for these set of businesses the possible effects of the price elasticity of
demand and supply still exist.

22

Thomson Reuters Tax & Accounting, Who Needs Sec. 179 Expensing When 100% Bonus Depreciation Is
Available? Thomson Reuters (Oct. 5, 2018), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/who-needs-sec-179expensing-when-100-bonus-depreciation-is-available/
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Cash Flow.
Even though not explicitly stated, section 179 expensing provisions are structured by their very nature in such
a manner as to particularly benefit small and medium-sized businesses. However, the wide-scale impact of
this policy on small-scale businesses is arguable. The onslaught of the pandemic has dealt a blow to most
industries and small businesses have been particularly impacted by the economic downturn. This state of
affairs leaves small businesses who typically have restricted access to the debt and equity markets without
the option of maximizing this tax policy incentive.
In the rather few cases where such businesses can raise loans to take advantage of incentives such as this,
the intended benefits of the tax incentives are greatly diminished for two reasons:
1. The cost of internal funds for small businesses are typically considerably lower than the cost of external
funds, due to the limited and much more expensive financing options available to smaller companies.
2. Businesses with net operating losses are unable to increase liquidity in the short term because they are
unable to expense the full cost of qualified assets in the same tax year when the business entity begins
to utilize them.23
A research study conducted by Cohen and Cummings24 found that although approximately 50 percent of all
C and S corporations took advantage of accelerated-depreciation related tax incentives, only 10 percent of
those companies asserted that the tax breaks were a major consideration in determining the timing or amount
of qualifying investments made.

23

Richard Phillips & Steve Wamhoff, The Failure of Expensing and Other Depreciation Tax Breaks, Institute
on Taxation and Economic Policy (Nov. 19, 2018), https://itep.org/the-failure-of-expensing-and-otherdepreciation-tax-breaks/
24

Darrel Cohen & Jason Cummins, A Retrospective Evaluation of the Effects of Temporary Partial
Expensing, Federal Reserve Board (Apr. 2006),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200619/200619pap.pdf
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Their findings imply that 90 percent of the companies that claimed a tax break under the applicable tax laws
would have undertaken those projects regardless of the tax break and so may have simply altered their timing
to take advantage of the tax benefits. Based on these findings, some analysts argue that accelerated
depreciation under both section 179 and section 168(k) of the Code is largely unnecessary, as astute
business professionals would only undertake investments and business expansion which would eventually
provide value that exceeds the costs incurred in undertaking such ventures.
Therefore, such investments will be made regardless of the provision of tax breaks as long as they are
beneficial to the business. Accelerated depreciation will only serve to hasten such expansion which would
have been conducted in the long term.
Philips and Wamhoff argue that accelerated depreciation engineers a shift in the U.S. tax system from taxing
income to taxing consumption, thereby effectively exempting income derived from investments from
taxation.25 While some economists argue that this serves the economy better as businesses tend to invest
more if such investment income is tax-exempt, this line of thought seems to have been effectively diminished
by the argument that businesses would still invest in ventures that offer the promise of profitable returns.
Therefore, it stands to reason that if accelerated depreciation does not incentivize businesses to undertake
investments that they would not otherwise undertake, then tax policy breaks such as this only serve to deprive
the government of the much-needed revenue it requires to perform crucial functions such as the provision of
public goods and services and the maintenance of law and an orderly society.
Prior to the pandemic the Trump administration and those who supported accelerated depreciation under the
TCJA touted improved wages, better job numbers and more foreign direct investment as accruing benefits
of this policy.26

25

26

WAMHOFF & PHILIPS, Supra

note 23

White House, President Trump Proposed a Massive Tax Cut. Here’s What You Need to Know, (April. 26, 2017)
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/articles/president-trump-proposed-massive-tax-cut-heres-need-know/
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Over three years into the enactment of this Act, the facts obtainable across the United States are in stark
contrast to the assertions of the Trump administration.
Ben Page, an economist at the non-partisan Urban-Brookings Tax Policy Center described the prevalent
state of affairs even prior to the pandemic in these words:
“We saw a short-term boost to output and investment that really seems to have largely dissipated.
GDP is growing more slowly and investment is actually shrinking over the past two quarters, there’s
almost no evidence for a big inflow of foreign capital27.”

It is also important to note that accelerated depreciation as provided for under section 179 and section 168(K)
of the Code will fail as a policy tool to attract foreign direct investment into large corporations in the U.S.
This is because even though most companies pay less than the statutory tax rate of 35 percent and others
pay no taxes at all, accelerated depreciation is not reflected in the financial statements of companies nor
does it impact the after-tax book earnings available to potential investors. As noted by Professor Batchelder,
not even a savvy investor or analyst could utilize publicly available information to piece together the
necessary information and use that to accurately determine a firm’s after-tax economic income for the
financial year in view. This is because financial statements treat accelerated cost recovery and expensing as
lacking any economic benefit to firms.28 To whatever limited extent that investors and analysts might be able
to estimate a firm’s marginal tax rate, not only would this require considerable time and resources but

27

Max de Haldevang, Two Years Into Trump’s Tax Cut, the Results Are Not Promising, Quartz (Dec. 22,
2019), https://qz.com/1769421/trumps-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-shows-poor-results-after-two-years/
28

Lily L. Batchelder, Accounting for Behavioral Considerations in Business Tax Reform: The Case of
Expensing, Ssrn (Jan. 25, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2904885
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econometric findings based on the work of scholars such as Chen and Schoderbek (2000) find that investors
and analysts tend to largely rely on statutory or book tax rates.29
The significant reliance of prospective investors on statutory and book-tax rates explains why firms have
lobbied congress for years to reduce the statutory tax rate. An official reduction in the statutory tax rate has
the most impact on a corporation’s financial statements and has the potential to shore up share prices and
attract both foreign and domestic investment.
Section 168(k) of the Code, which enables businesses to expense the full cost of purchases, costs the U.S.
government much more and is most beneficial to large businesses, who rarely ever need these tax shelters
to remain profitable and in business.
In 2020 the United States Government ran an estimated deficit of USD 3.1 trillion, more than triple the deficit
in the fiscal year 2019 and the greatest deficit as a share of the economy since 1945.30 While this was in no
small measure increased by the ongoing pandemic, the tax breaks under the TCJA are a significant
contributory factor.
Tax breaks under the TCJA, such as accelerated depreciation is estimated to add 1-2 trillion USD to the
federal debt31 and even though the effects of these mammoth deficits are yet to be felt across the U.S.
economy, such deficits are not sustainable eternally and its adverse effects are inevitable if left unaddressed.

29

Anne C. Ehinger et al., Let’s Talk About Tax: The Determinants and Consequences of Income Tax Mentions
During Conference Calls, Wharton Accounting (Sept. 2017), https://accounting.wharton.upenn.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/ELST_2017.pdf
30

Bipartisan Policy Center, Deficit Tracker, BPC’s economic policy team analyzes the government’s running
budget deficit and updates the Deficit Tracker every month, (April 12, 2021)
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/report/deficit-tracker/
31

Federal Budget Outlook, Tax Policy Center, https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-tcjaaffect-federal-budget-outlook (last updated May 2020)
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Wasteful tax shelters introduced and expanded under the TCJA drove up deficits thereby considerably
impairing the ability of the United States government to effectively and promptly contain and address the
COVID-19 pandemic from the outset32 due to tight budgets.
A consequence of the deficits worsened by the tax breaks given under the TCJA is tighter budgets. As can
be easily deduced with little effort from ongoing mass unemployment in the United States, tighter budgets
result in reduced hiring or even furloughs in some cases and in worst-case scenarios, which is currently the
case in the United States, mass unemployment and shrinking of the government workforce.
Economic rebound is inextricably linked to recovery from the corona-virus pandemic, which has devastated
lives as much as it has small businesses. The fiscal squeeze facing federal and state governments,
engineered by severe short-fall in revenue can undermine the ability of the government to undertake the
necessary fund-intensive projects such as vaccinations that are indispensable to recovery from the health
and economic crisis.
As noted in a report from the Congressional Research Service, bonus depreciation is a relatively ineffective
means to stimulate the U.S. economy during periods of limited growth.33 Decisive action should be taken to
extensively limit tax policy breaks such as those under the Code as amended by the TCJA which add little to
the economy.

32

William Wan, America Is Running Short on Masks, Gowns and Gloves. Again., Washinton Post (July 8,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/07/08/ppe-shortage-masks-gloves-gowns/
33

Gary Guenther, The Section 179 and Section 168(k) Expensing Allowances: Current Law and Economic
Effects, Congressional Research Service, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31852.pdf (last visited Mar. 4,
2021)
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Opportunity Zones.
The concept of Opportunity Zones is fairly novel and was first popularized in 2015 by Jared Bernstein and
Kevin A. Hasset in a joint research publication34 They described Opportunity Zones as “regional incentives
or a geography preference program to address the persistent poverty and uneven recovery that has left too
many American communities behind”
The Economic Innovation Group, a DC-based bi-partisan public policy, research, and advocacy organization
defines opportunity zones as “low-income census tracts nominated by governors and certified by the U.S.
Department of Treasury into which investors can now put capital to work, financing new projects and
enterprises in exchange for certain federal capital gains tax advantages”35
Section 13823 of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act amended the Internal Revenue Code to authorize the
designation of opportunity zones in low-income communities and to provide tax incentives for investments in
the zones, including deferring the recognition of capital gains that are reinvested in the zones
This provision of the TCJA enables investors in qualifying zones to take advantage of three tax benefits as
follows:
I. Tax on capital gains from existing assets that are transferred to an opportunity zone fund can be deferred
and reduced until liquidated or 2026, whichever is earlier.
II. if an investment in an opportunity zone is held for a minimum of ten years, resulting capital gains will not
be taxed.

34

Bernstein & Hasset, Unlocking Private Capital to Facilitate Economic Growth in Distressed Areas
https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/Unlocking-Private-Capital-to-Facilitate-Growth.pdf (last accessed:
Mar 5, 2021)
35

Jared Bernstein & Kevin A. Hassett, Unlocking Private Capital to Facilitate Economic Growth in Distressed
Areas, Economic Innovation Group (Apr. 2015), https://eig.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/UnlockingPrivate-Capital-to-Facilitate-Growth.pdf
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III. Appreciated assets in Opportunity Funds held for at least five years receive a readjusted basis for tax
purposes up to 10 percent, and if the investment is held for at least seven years investors receive an
additional basis step-up equal to 15 percent.
The Treasury Department proposed regulations36 provides a number of guidelines to stem abuse of
opportunity zones and ensure the purpose for which these zones were established is achieved. One of these
is that a prospective investor cannot invest in opportunity zones directly, but must do so through opportunity
funds.
A qualified opportunity fund is a conduit set up by a corporation or partnership primarily to facilitate
investments in designated opportunity zone property. A key requirement is that 90 percent of the assets of
an opportunity fund must be held in qualifying opportunity zone property; otherwise monetary penalties will
be awarded against the fund.
The Joint Committee on Taxation describe qualified opportunity zone property to include qualified opportunity
zone stock, opportunity zone partnership interest and opportunity zone business property. To properly
analyze their effect, we must examine each of the above.
The shares of any U.S. corporation that qualifies as an opportunity zone business at the time of its first
issuance, meets all eligibility requirements for investment by opportunity funds, as long as the following are
complied with: payment is made in January 2018 or afterwards in cash only, and beginning from the time of
purchase through the period the stock is held by the fund, the business from which the stocks were purchased
remains an opportunity zone business.
Qualified Opportunity Zone partnership interests are investment interests in a U.S. registered partnership
business that also meets the requisite requirements to be an opportunity zone business.

36

Internal Revenue Service, Investing in Qualified Opportunity Funds, Federal Register (Oct. 29, 2018),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/10/29/2018-23382/investing-in-qualified-opportunity-funds
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The Joint Committee on Taxation outlined the requirements for an interest to be deemed a qualified
opportunity-zone partnership interest as follows: purchase of partnership interest must have been made after
December 2017, by cash only, at a period when the partnership maintained its status as a qualified
opportunity zone business and the partnership must maintain this status throughout the period its interest is
held.
Finally, the committee defines qualified opportunity-zone business property as chattels used in the trade or
business of a qualified opportunity fund or business.
For tangibles to be deemed qualified opportunity-zone business property, the property must be purchased
after December 2017 for initial use by a qualified fund or business.

Opportunity Zones and the U.S. economy.
The United States Department of Commerce Economic Development Association (“EDA”) under the Trump
administration praised the creation of Opportunity Zones as advancing economic development and
increasing job opportunities across economically distressed communities in the United States.
The EDA also credited a mile-marker of over half a billion USD in almost 400 projects to the creation of
opportunity zones. However, it is important to note that these numbers include projects outside communities
certified as opportunity zones but in proximity to them.
A report released by the White House - Council of Economic Advisers (“CEA”) in August 2020, titled: “The
impact of opportunity zones: An initial assessment report” predicted that opportunity zones would create
500,000 jobs and lift a million people out of poverty.37 The Trump administration further claimed in this

37

White House Council of Economic Advisors, The Impact of Opportunity Zones: An Initial Assessment
Report, U.S. Economic Development Administration (Aug. 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2020/08/The-Impact-of-Opportunity-Zones-An-Initial-Assessment.pdf
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document that by December 2019 over $78 billion worth of investments would have been made in
underserved communities through the creation of opportunity zones in them.
These statistics imply that opportunity zones have been greatly successful and continue to spur economic
growth across the U.S.
Pursuant to the objective of this paper, we seek to determine if the tax breaks associated with this policy
have translated to actual meaningful change in the daily lives and living standards of lower-income Americans
and ‘distressed’ populations such as minorities and indigenous peoples.
I will focus my review on the impact of opportunity zones on distressed populations such as minorities and
low-income earners for two reasons:
i.

Opportunity Zones were created primarily to impact low-income communities, the majority of which
constitute ‘distressed’ populations, defined by the EDA to include “a higher share of African
Americans, Hispanics, and high school dropouts”

ii. These segments of the U.S. population continue to be disproportionately affected by the Covid-19
pandemic, due to factors such as inadequate housing and sanitation infrastructure, both attributable
to poverty.

The CEA in their report noted that a significant number of census tracts that house minorities and a sizable
population of some of the poorest communities in the United States have been designated opportunity zones
and so African-Americans and Hispanics are some of the notable beneficiaries of the numerous
accompanying benefits attributable to opportunity zones.
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These claims were backed up by former President Trump when he pointed to opportunity zones as proof he
had done more for the Black community “than any President since Abraham Lincoln”38 However, this does
not appear to be the case.
The Urban Institute, a leading non-profit research organization released a research report39 in June 2020,
that interviewed 70 investors, fund managers and related business individuals that have ties to opportunity
zones. The Institute’s report found that contrary to claims made by the Trump administration, “Opportunity
Zones have generally failed to live up to its economic and community development goals”, especially for
minorities.
Insights gained from the conduct of independent research and interview of key players in opportunity zones
demonstrates that opportunity zones by their design incentivizes investors to pursue profit not impact. This
is because opportunity zones offer the most benefits to projects with the highest returns, not projects that
address the most significant needs of host communities. This explains why market-rate real-estate projects
such as luxurious apartments and hotels get abundant access to opportunity zone funds while affordable
housing deals or small minority businesses in need of an equity partner or funding get little to no funds.40
The job opportunities that investment in luxurious real estate across opportunity zone tracts provides are
largely unskilled, low-wage and temporary, as construction workers and other manual laborers are contract
workers and are discarded as soon as the construction is completed. This creates a façade of gainful
employment which cannot be further from the truth.
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In June 2020, Novogradac, a national professional services organization that provides certified public
accounting, valuation, and consulting services reported that over 95 percent of the funds raised across
opportunity zones in the U.S. at the time went to large commercial or residential real estate instead of the
small businesses the tax policy is supposed to support41.
This lends credence to the criticism that opportunity zones have done more to gentrify minority neighborhoods
than to build them up.
“We continually see a lack of understanding, a lack of regard to the needs and challenges of Black and brown
businesses” said Connie Evans, President and CEO of the Association for Enterprise Opportunity, a D.C.based trade association that advocates for organizations that provide capital and support to underserved
entrepreneurs.
Connie Evans criticized opportunity zones due to its universal structure which is not tailored to work with the
peculiarities that define underserved and minority entrepreneurs and communities.
She likened opportunity zones to federal anti-poverty and economic relief programs such as the paycheck
protection program that failed to reach many minorities and small-business owners who lack banking
relationships, and in the case of opportunity zones - the technical expertise to comb through the hundreds of
pages of IRS and treasury guidelines regulating opportunity zones and make the most of investment
opportunities available therein.42
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Finally, like every facet of life in the U.S, Bloomberg unsurprisingly reports that minority leaders of opportunity
zone projects continue to contend with racial discrimination from prospective investors.43 A developer told
the Urban Institute during the interview that a number of wealthy investors had shut out pitches from minority
developers simply based on their skin color.

Recommendations
The creation of Opportunity Zones is a laudable initiative and portends numerous benefits not only for
investors or recipient communities but for the United States economy as a whole. However, in its current
state, opportunity zones leave much to be desired and grossly fall short of its objectives.
To maximize its potential and stem avenues for it to serve as a wasteful tax break, the Biden administration
should begin by aggregating data from its implementation and operation across the U.S. for analysis and
review of its impact. Recommendations made have been largely based off conjecture, speculation and
privately-funded research constrained by time and resources. However, a robust government-sponsored
initiative to collect and review data from opportunity zones will inform necessary law and tax policy
amendments that will engineer monumental changes for all.
In other to ensure the efficacy of this tax break, the Treasury Department must come up with guidelines
prohibiting and penalizing racist overtures by investors as these sideline a majority of the persons opportunity
zones are meant to benefit.
In order to stem abuse of its processes, it is also recommended that qualified opportunity tax zone projects
be limited to specific high-impact areas. This may vary across parts of the U.S. and should not be overbroad
in its applicability as to serve as a tax shelter for wealthy individuals without any significant contribution to
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critical sectors of the local, state or federal economy. In doing this the Biden administration should restructure
opportunity zones to better incentivize investments in small businesses and projects that actually provide
jobs and benefit struggling communities regardless of profitability, as real estate alone cannot do this. Largescale investment in community development financial institutions is key to achieving this objective.44
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Foreign Derived Intangible Income.
Background
Before the enactment of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the U.S. operated a residence-based, “worldwide”
corporate tax system45. Under this system, U.S.-based companies generally had no immediately arising tax
obligations to the U.S. government when they earned revenue in a foreign jurisdiction until the funds earned
in the foreign jurisdiction were repatriated. This arrangement greatly incentivized U.S. companies to keep
their profits outside the U.S. and in some cases go the extra length of also moving their legal headquarters
to low-tax foreign jurisdictions, while they retained most of their U.S.-based workforce and culture through a
process known as inversion46.
The 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act introduced provisions such as the Global Intangible Low Tax Income
(“GILTI”) and the Foreign Derived Intangible Income (“FDII”) amongst others, to address the problems which
the worldwide corporate tax system occasioned.

FDII.
Bloomberg Tax succinctly defines FDII as that “portion of a domestic corporation’s intangible income that is
derived from serving foreign markets, and determined on a formulaic basis”47
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The concept of the tax break framed as FDII under the TCJA, and the rationale behind it isn’t new. Prior tax
schemes such as IC-DISCs (interest-charge domestic international sales corporations) and ETI (extraterritorial income) are largely similar to the FDII provision under the TCJA. However, some important
differences between FDII and these other tax incentives are as follows: FDII tax deductions unlike prior
related tax schemes are primarily deductible on income derived from the sale of intangible property such as
patents and copyrights, and the products that are made from these patents. In addition, all companies
regardless of size are eligible to take advantage of this benefit, and there are no requirements which mandate
that the goods or services sold be wholly or partly (up to a certain threshold) manufactured in the United
States.
However, like prior U.S. international tax incentives the requirement that the subject of the sale be utilized
outside the U.S, and revenue eligible for FDII tax deductions be generated wholly from outside the U.S. also
applies to FDII. Any sales made from products that will eventually end up in the U.S. market do not qualify
for FDII deductions.
The FDII provisions, although primarily targeted at intangible income, enable eligible U.S. companies to claim
up to a 37.5 percent deduction from their taxable income on eligible sales made outside the United States on
certain tangibles. The maximum deductible amount will be reduced to 21.875 percent by 2026.
The deductible amount is calculated by evaluating metrics such as a C-corporation’s net foreign-derived
income in comparison to its total net income and its deemed intangible income.
To comprehend the policy drivers behind the FDII and how this tax break is expected to work, it is important
to explain the following:
Qualified Business Asset Investment (“QBAI”): These are assets whose depreciation can be computed under
section 167 of the Code and which are employed in the active trade or business of a company.
Deemed Intangible Income: This is any income that is more than 10 percent of the Qualified Business Asset
Investment.
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Any deemed intangible income that is realized from a foreign country is deemed FDII and therefore tax
deductible as such.

FDII Tax Calculations:
The procedure to determine FDII as follows:
•

Calculate the Deduction Eligible Income (DEI).
DEI = Gross Income from business activities generally – deductions allocable to the gross income.

•

Determine QBAI = Assets whose depreciation can be computed under section 167 of the Code and
which are employed in the active trade or business of a company.

•

Calculate Deemed Intangible Income (DII) = Income that is more than ten percent of the Qualified
Business Asset Investment.

•

Determine the Foreign-derived Deduction Eligible Income (FD DEI). FD DEI is simply the foreign
portion of the DEI, and includes any income from sales or dispositions to a foreign person for foreign
use.

•

Calculate Foreign Derived Intangible Income (FDII). This is Deemed Intangible Income multiplied by
the ratio of the corporation’s Foreign Derived Deduction Eligible Income to its Deduction Eligible
Income.

•

Multiply your FDII by 37.5 percent to determine FDII reduction

As may be deduced from the above and complementary to the GILTI tax provision, FDII was introduced by
the Trump administration to incentivize U.S. based C-companies or U.S based subsidiaries of foreign
companies who hold intangible assets such as patents outside the U.S. and generate revenue from these to
rather earn this income in the United States, or if earned outside the U.S, to repatriate them back into the
country.
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By offering eligible C-corporations an effective tax rate of 13.125 percent on foreign-generated income,
companies, particularly those who have smaller amounts of fixed assets will have little incentive to perpetually
keep intangible assets and revenue generated therefrom in low-tax jurisdictions outside the U.S.
The success of this tax policy was envisaged by the Trump administration to shore up capital and domestic
investment within the U.S. The effects of this will improve the balance of trade, lower deficits and create more
jobs.

Criticisms.
One of the most pervasive criticisms of FDII is the complex and resource-intensive computations eligible
companies must undertake to fully take advantage of this tax benefit. However, the validity of this criticism
may be muted by the fact that a significant percentage of companies at whom this incentive is targeted
typically possess the resources necessary to take advantage of it, and whatever expense that is incurred in
taking advantage of the FDII tax break is insignificant in comparison to the amount saved. However, this may
vitiate the broad applicability of FDII to smaller companies, on the basis that there will be little to no incentive
for them to take advantage of this tax break if the overall cost of doing so is almost the same as the benefits
or outweighs it. Current rules have relaxed documentation requirements; however, the costs remain
significant.

Eric Solomon, a former assistant secretary focusing on Tax Policy at the U.S. Treasury Department noted in
a presentation at the Georgetown Tax Law and Public Finance Workshop that the FDII provision may turn
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out to be counter-productive if other countries in retaliatory response to this tax policy go on to introduce even
lower corporate tax rates or other incentives which simply will not be approved in the U.S. by Congress.48
Such an occurrence will only serve to further incentivize companies to derive their earnings outside the United
States and leave the U.S. in a worse-off position than it was prior to the enactment of the FDII provision.

Chris Sanchirico, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania also noted a different means through
which the FDII provision could be counter-productive.
According to him, in a bid for companies to pay as little tax as possible, evade any punitive measures by the
GILTI provision but also take advantage of the tax incentives under the FDII provision where possible, more
U.S. companies may undertake more capital investments abroad such as building more offshore facilities
like factories since this will increase their tangible assets outside the US and thereby shelter more of their
profits from tax. FDII means having more tangible assets in the U.S. will result in smaller tax breaks; this
flaw will undoubtedly result in the loss of capital and jobs to foreign jurisdictions49
As rightly noted by several commentators, the FDII and GILTI provision is a carrot and stick approach to get
companies to earn income in the United States rather than overseas, and to enable the federal government
to tax this income. However, the success of the FDII provision is greatly limited by the following realities:
A significant number of the countries that serve as tax havens to major U.S. companies, such as Ireland,
afford such companies the luxury of single-digit to no tax rates at all, which is simply unrealistic in the United
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States. A single-digit tax rate will not be approved by the U.S. Congress, regardless of which political party
is in control of Congress due to the United States government’s considerable reliance on taxes. Tax
incentives such as FDII simply cannot effectively compete with the tax rates offered by tax havens. In March
2021, Kimberly Clausing testified50 before the Senate Committee on Finance. Her report indicated that the
amount of total foreign income housed by U.S. multinational corporations in seven prominent tax havens
remained largely unchanged for the two years (FY 2018 & 2019) immediately following the enactment of the
TCJA. Her testimony indicated that despite the FDII provisions, tax havens remain attractive destinations for
U.S. corporations to avoid taxes.
The success of policies such as FDII and GILTI is largely dependent on the discretionary response of
companies, and when compared vis-à-vis the benefits of stashing income in tax havens, it is highly unlikely
that these companies at whom the FDII is targeted will exercise their discretion in favor of the U.S.
government. More so, since these companies continue to enjoy the international and domestic advantages
of being a U.S. incorporated business entity even when they actively undertake activities geared solely at tax
avoidance, they have no real incentive to consider the interests of the government that creates and maintains
an enabling environment for them to grow and thrive. It might be imperative for the government to enact
broad rules which compel U.S. incorporated companies to pay the full tax rates, as soon as they are earned
anywhere in the world, or lose access to the U.S. market and all other accruing benefits such as relative
government protection which U.S. companies and their principal officers enjoy.
The tax policy center reports that other critics such as finance ministers in the European Union (“EU”) are
concerned that FDII is an illegal backdoor export subsidy, which violates World Trade Organization trade
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rules because it only applies to profits on foreign sales and is therefore a “prohibitive subsidy contingent on
export.”51 The validity of this argument has not been tested as no country has challenged this tax incentive
before the World Trade Organization. However, the EU has published criticisms of this provision52 and
requested that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development conduct a review to determine
whether FDII qualifies as a harmful tax practice.53
The effective 37.5 percent FDII tax deduction afforded to companies by FDII is temporary and so will be
reduced to 21.875 percent by December 2025. This change which will be effective in four years, may
discourage corporations from taking advantage of FDII because most companies plan long-term, and so may
be unlikely to take advantage of this incentive due to its short duration and uncertain future, as proposed tax
reforms by the Biden administration remain a credible threat to its continuity.
President Biden has presented an infrastructure spending plan and tax reform plan that will effectively raise
corporate income taxes. The Biden administration proposes to do this in part by repealing the FDII provision
under the TCJA and setting the corporate income tax rate at 28 percent, which is a 7percent increase from
the currently existing tax rate.54
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Conclusion.
The Covid-19 pandemic has considerably increased the number of cross-border sales transactions that take
place over the internet. This has improved the prospects for U.S. businesses to generate more intangible
income abroad. The worldwide corporate tax system was flawed and simply not designed to take maximum
advantage of the opportunities which currently exist. FDII places the U.S. at a much better vantage point.
However, it is still yet to be seen if the end will justify the means.
The Joint Committee on Taxation estimates that FDII will cost the U.S. government over $US 63 billion dollars
in revenue55 over the next 10 years, for a provision whose efficacy is dependent on external factors such as
the response of other countries and which likely violates the WTO rules this is a considerable tradeoff. The
success of the FDII provision depends considerably on the response of companies and a poor response rate
may mean that FDII will end up being a wasteful tax shelter for export-oriented domestic companies.
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